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WHY ROE WON’T GO 
MICHAEL S. GREVE* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am quite fond of jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues, and I cannot 
think of a more judicious and sure-footed guide through this terrain than 
Richard Fallon.  I shall not quarrel with Professor Fallon’s legal analysis of his 
hypotheticals on the retroactive application of pre-Roe1 abortion statutes or on 
the extraterritorial application of post-Roe state laws (the gravamen of 
Professor Fallon’s article2 and argument).  The real difficulty with Professor 
Fallon’s essay, it seems to me, lies elsewhere: ultimately, the argument lacks 
the moral seriousness that befits this sordid subject. 
I.  NO WAY 
I begin with a confident prediction: Roe will not be overturned any time 
soon. That is not simply a matter of judicial “vote counting”; even an 
additional anti-Roe vote on the Supreme Court would not materially change 
my prediction.  The reason is that Justices do what Richard Fallon asks us to 
do here: they try to envision the consequences of their decisions, especially on 
matters of such gravity.  The most certain consequence of overruling Roe 
would be a massive political upheaval.  On one side, the Republican Party 
would face terrible difficulties in maintaining its electoral coalition, at least 
through one or two election cycles.  On the other side, overturning Roe might 
do what even Bush v. Gore3 failed to do—sour the legal establishment on the 
Court. 
The weight of these considerations in the judicial calculus is a matter of 
conjecture.  Perhaps, the Justices do not care much about election outcomes 
(although by some accounts, past abortion decisions have been “timed” for 
 
* John G. Searle scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Director of AEI’s Federalism Project.  
Ph.D., Cornell University. 
 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-
Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007). 
 3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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elections).4  Perhaps, they ignore the clamor and chatter at the Harvard Law 
School and its New York Times satellite offices.5  And perhaps, the legal 
establishment would digest the demise of Roe v. Wade at the same speed with 
which it seems to have digested Bush v. Gore—as a shocking betrayal that 
leaves a very bad aftertaste but ultimately, not a sufficiently compelling reason 
to revisit the institutional commitment to an imperial Court.  Against these 
“perhapses,” however, stands the fact that the Justices care very much about 
their own future places in history and, moreover, about the Court’s institutional 
prestige and reputation.  These in turn depend on a political base that will 
defend the Court as an institution.6  Under current and reasonably foreseeable 
conditions, that base cannot be the Federalist Society, and it cannot be the law 
schools.  Rather, the Court’s political base is an eclectic, ideologically diverse 
mix of court-centered activists and interest groups—all of them dismayed (for 
widely varying reasons) with what the Court has done, but all of them hoping 
that the Court may yet come to see the light on “their” issues. 
Having staked its institutional prestige on Roe and its progeny, the Court 
will be hard-pressed to find a face-saving exit.  A dramatic, outright reversal of 
Roe might easily prompt a potent institutional attack from the losing side.  If I 
am right about its likely electoral consequences, it might even cause very bad 
blood all around.  It is, in all events, not calculated to help the Court 
institutionally. 
I will briefly return to this point at the end of my remarks.  My initial 
observation is this: for a Court that wants to get out of “the abortion-umpiring 
business,”7 or even for a Court that does not give a rip about abortion per se 
but simply looks to its own institutional interests, the optimal strategy is to 
eviscerate Roe piecemeal, one restriction at a time.  The conceptual framework 
of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey8 leaves ample 
 
 4. David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 509, 583 (2001). 
 5. However, Judge Larry Silberman some years ago famously attributed the Supreme 
Court’s solicitude of elite opinion to a “Greenhouse Effect,” as in Linda Greenhouse of The New 
York Times.  Judge Laurence Silberman, Judicial Activism: The Press Pulls the Strings, Speech 
Before the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. (June 13, 1992), in TEX. LAW., June 29, 1992, 
at 15.  Greenhouse herself has been very candid about her views on intensely controversial 
constitutional issues, including abortion.  Linda Greenhouse, A Bridge Over Troubled Water: 
2006 Radcliff Institute Medal Acceptance Speech (June 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.radcliffe.edu/alumnae/ reunions/4and9/greenhouse.php. 
 6. The contention that the Supreme Court (like any other political institution) needs a base 
of support is a central point of ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (4th 
ed. 2005).  See also Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court from Early Burger to Early Rehnquist, in 
THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 47 (Anthony King ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
 7. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 8. 505 U.S. 833. 
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room for that strategy.  Depending on the future appointments, Justice 
Kennedy’s calculations about his legacy, and the sequencing of abortion cases, 
the Supreme Court may well use that maneuvering room.  That way, if Roe 
were eventually repealed, it would no longer matter very much. 
II.  SUBSTANCE AND JURISDICTION 
The considerations just sketched, I admit, are somewhat unfair to Richard 
Fallon.  “Ain’t gonna happen” is not a compelling response—it is no response 
at all—to the proposition that Roe might be overturned, which is the 
speculation Professor Fallon asks us to entertain.9  Moreover, a gradual 
evisceration of Roe could pose many of the difficulties he discusses.  If a 
wholesale abortion prohibition can be enforced extraterritorially, then so can a 
partial one.  So what of it? 
Professor Fallon’s central thesis—that the Supreme Court could not get out 
of the “abortion-umpiring business”10 even if it wanted to, at least not by 
means of overruling Roe11—depends in some sense on what exactly one means 
by “umpiring.”  What Justice Scalia meant by that phrase (contained in an 
impassioned opinion)12 is that the Court should abandon the attempt to define 
the contours of an extra-textual constitutional right.  He has consistently 
maintained that the Court is ill-equipped to serve as the nation’s moral 
guardian—among other reasons, because the attempt to umpire a culture war 
eventually forces the Court to choose sides.13  I do not believe, however, that 
Justice Scalia then wrote or now labors under the impression that a reversal of 
Roe would spell an automatic end to all cases involving abortion in some way 
or another.  If the Supreme Court were to surrender its monopoly over the 
definition of abortion rights, those rights would be defined elsewhere, 
predominantly (though perhaps not exclusively) in the states.  As Professor 
Fallon observes, the substitution of a uniform right with a federal, 
decentralized arrangement necessitates a determination of exactly which state 
gets to decide what and for whom.14  State laws on abortion, as on all other 
matters, may pose difficult problems of jurisdiction, choice of law, and the 
 
 9. See generally Fallon, supra note 2. 
 10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 11. Fallon, supra note 2, at 612–14. 
 12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 13. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When the Court 
takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins—and more 
specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the 
Court’s Members are drawn.”). 
 14. Fallon, supra note 2, at 633–36. 
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like.  Surely, Justice Scalia understands that point.  (He used to teach Conflicts 
of Law.15) 
The question is whether there is a meaningful difference between the direct 
judicial determination of abortion rights and the adjudication of jurisdictional 
questions that arise over politically and statutorily determined abortion rights.  
On that score, it seems to me that there is all the difference in the world 
between an abortion case and an abortion-related case on, say, the choice of 
law; between the umpiring of abortion and a second-order determination of 
which state gets to decide what with respect to abortion.  A few examples 
illustrate the difference. 
Commerce Clause16 decisions are jurisdictional decisions.  The scope of 
the Commerce Clause determines which jurisdiction, state or federal, gets to 
decide what.  Under the post-New Deal understanding, any economic 
transaction is ipso facto “interstate commerce,” and so the modern Commerce 
Clause decisions have involved controversial social issues with a highly 
attenuated economic nexus: guns in schools, violence against women, illegal 
drugs.  Yet few, I trust, would contend that the Supreme Court was “umpiring” 
those issues in Lopez,17 Morrison,18 or Raich.19  Raich was no more pro-”War 
on Drugs” than Lopez was pro-guns in schools or than Morrison was pro-gang 
rape.  The Justices can easily tell the difference between substance and 
jurisdiction, and so can the public. 
Judicial decisions concerning gay rights and especially same-sex marriage 
illustrate the same point.  State court decisions that directly umpire those 
matters—”homosexual marriage, yea or nay”—are invariably the stuff of 
national press coverage.  Second-order jurisdictional controversies have largely 
failed to attract comparable coverage, though not for lack of occasion.  
Because gay marriage involves a complicated web of ongoing relations rather 
than a one-shot act, it poses far more, and far more difficult, jurisdictional and 
choice-of-law questions than would abortion.  For example, the highest courts 
of Vermont and Virginia have become embroiled in a nasty dispute over 
custody rights arising from one of Vermont’s “civil unions.”  (Is Virginia 
compelled to recognize Vermont law in that dispute?  Is Vermont in turn 
compelled to respect Virginia’s emphatic “no” to that question?  Who gets to 
 
 15. See Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies 
current.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
 17. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (addressing guns in schools). 
 18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (addressing violence against women). 
 19. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (addressing medical marijuana). 
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keep the child?)20  Vermont was the first civil union state;21 Virginia sports the 
most draconian anti-gay marriage constitution in the country.22  Evidently, the 
citizens of those states take marriage laws seriously.  And yet, the vexing 
custody case, which puts the laws of both states to the test, has attracted no 
public notice, let alone commotion. 
Jurisdictional cases may simply be too complicated for newspaper 
headlines and public consumption.  But that only goes to show that at some 
level, the complications matter.  They dampen feverish public agitation, and 
they independently affect the case outcomes.  In jurisdictional or choice-of-law 
cases, one can actually imagine Justices and judges taking “positions” at 
variance with their underlying substantive preferences.  As Justice Scalia might 
say, the presence of a jurisdictional issue forces the Court to act as an actual 
court of law, instead of simply “choosing sides” in a law-free environment. 
Richard Fallon suggests that there is no getting away from the substance.  
For example, the adjudication of jurisdictional cases might still compel the 
Court to make a determination with respect to the strength of the state’s 
interest in regulating abortion.23  Perhaps so.  I will even grant a concession 
that Professor Fallon does not invite: judicial preferences on abortion rights 
may be sufficiently intense to affect the determination of second-order 
questions.  It is perfectly plausible to argue that the Roe Court hand-tailored 
doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness to fit the abortion context,24 and 
that the post-Roe Court created a kind of second-class free speech status for 
abortion protesters.25  If Roe were overturned, something of the sort might 
come to pass in abortion-related cases on jurisdiction and choice of law.  But if 
abortion rights have a gravitational pull, then so does the rest of the legal 
universe.  Rules of general applicability are not easily tailored to individual 
issues, and even the most results-oriented judge will have to consider how a 
rule that produces the “right” abortion result would play out in a different 
context, in the hands of different judges. 
 
 20. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); see also Alan J. Keays, Civil-Union Custody 
Suit Back in Rutland Court, RUTLAND HERALD, Nov. 16, 2006, at A1. 
 21. See Ellen Barry, Eagerness and Some Resignation as Civil Union Law Takes Effect, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at B1. 
 22. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (effective Jan. 1, 2007). 
 23. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 634–36. 
 24. See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 603, 623–24 (1992). 
 25. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 785, 791–92, 803–04, 814 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court 
created a special First Amendment standard for abortion-related case). 
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III.  LITIGATION DYNAMICS 
Presumably, Richard Fallon intends his Article as more than a moot court 
exercise. If so, his examples should have some practical plausibility.  In my 
judgment, they lack that plausibility.  Instead, Professor Fallon’s scenarios 
assume a cascade of increasingly unlikely events.26 
First off, and most trivially, the Supreme Court does not have to hear any 
abortion-related case.  It can simply deny certiorari.  One would assume that a 
Court that has (by stipulation) taken abortion off its agenda would resist 
litigants’ attempts to force that subject back on to the docket.  Thus, something 
or somebody would practically have to force the Court’s hand. 
A series of circuit splits, accompanied by public clamor over the Court’s 
failure to address the matter, might fit that bill.  That scenario, however, 
supposes that Fallon-style cases arise with some regularity.  And that, in turn, 
supposes that voters, their state representatives, and public prosecutors will, in 
a post-Roe era, do extreme things—very extreme things, with sufficient 
regularity to produce a steady stream of litigation.  That seems exceedingly 
unlikely. 
Imagine, if you will (and as Richard Fallon asks you to) a state that is 
completely dominated by the most extreme contingent of the anti-abortion 
movement.27  No such state exists, but for the sake of Professor Fallon’s 
argument, I shall follow him and call it Utah.  Bear in mind that Professor 
Fallon’s scenarios presuppose a large supply of abortion-related cases, from 
several Circuits—meaning that a single Utah will not do.  Let us therefore 
envision a dozen Utahs, where rabid Right-to-Lifers get what they want: what 
will it be?  Professor Fallon presents several dire possibilities.  None of them 
are remotely plausible. 
Professor Fallon envisions prohibitory abortion statutes that make no 
exception for the health or even the life of the mother.  I doubt that any such 
statute would see the light of day.  If it did, it would not survive the death of a 
single woman, let alone the inevitable onslaught by the plaintiffs’ bar.  
Individual misfortunes with life-saving prescription drugs and vaccines 
routinely produce liability litigation and shrill denunciations of the producer’s 
and the government’s callousness.  An abortion statute that compelled the 
medical profession to tolerate serious injury or even death for women would 
soon be repealed. 
 
 26. I cannot discuss all of Professor Fallon’s hypotheticals.  My discussion is limited to the 
scenarios that occupy a large amount of space in his analysis.  I do not discuss Professor Fallon’s 
potential First Amendment problems, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 640–46, which, in an Internet 
age, can arise and have arisen over any number of morally freighted practices that are legal in 
some states but illegal in others.  The only question is whether we should have special rules for 
abortion-related speech, to which the answer is “no.” 
 27. Fallon, supra note 2, at 628. 
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Professor Fallon also envisions the retroactive enforcement of anti-
abortion statutes,28 as well as the enactment of extraterritorial criminal statutes, 
against women who have procured abortions.29  No serious right-to-life group, 
advocate, or institution proposes or even condones any such policy.  (At least 
one pro-life institution vehemently opposes such a policy: the Catholic 
Church.)30  Professor Fallon’s scenarios, then, must apply to the much 
narrower class of abortion providers, rather than consumers.  Even within this 
small class, however, the prospects of retroactive state enforcement and of 
extraterritorial legislation and enforcement seem very slim.  The states that are 
most likely to enforce pre-Roe statutes will have little occasion to do so.  Even 
now, the Utahs of this nation have only one or two abortion providers, and a 
few years hence the number may well be zero.31 
The prospect of a Utah law banning abortions and the prosecution of a 
California doctor for performing an abortion on a Utah citizen in California32 
strikes me as even more far-fetched.  Even supposing that such a law were 
enacted, who would enforce it and how?  Public prosecutors have no ready 
way of knowing who has left the state and for what reasons.  Perhaps, private 
informants—akin to whistleblowers or environmental citizen plaintiffs—could 
remedy that problem.  We now have to presume, however, that Utah citizens 
will not only vote for the law but will then assist in enforcing it—for example, 
by reporting to the authorities their next-door teenager’s suspicious weekend 
trip to an unknown destination, possibly California.  The authorities would 
then have to investigate whether the trip was (a) to California and (b) to an 
abortion clinic rather than Disneyland.  The authorities, moreover, would have 
to pay those exorbitant detection and enforcement costs with sufficient 
frequency to allow some organization to find a test case—nay, scores of test 
cases, including at least one in which the authorities do not simply drop the 
prosecution to defeat the legal challenge. 
To say that the scenario calls for speculation is to put it mildly.  It calls for 
absurdity. 
 
 28. Id. at 616–21. 
 29. Id. at 627–36. 
 30. Sister Paula Vandegaer, LCSW, After the Abortion, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/ 
programs/rlp/99rlvand.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 31. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, The Accessibility of Abortion Services 
in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 16 (2003) (“Measures of 
availability have generally declined since 1982: The number of abortion providers in the United 
States has fallen by 37%, and the proportion of women living in counties with no abortion 
provider has increased from 28% to 34%.”). 
 32. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 634. 
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IV.  ANALOGIES 
I have tried to think of historical parallels to a Roe reversal, on the theory 
that analogies might shed light where speculation easily leads astray.  The most 
obvious and current analogy is gay rights, specifically gay marriage.  
Certainly, the comparison is imperfect, as the Supreme Court has so far 
declined to establish a uniform rule (from which it might then have to retreat).  
However, the fear that the Supreme Court might take that step has prompted a 
great deal of political action in the states, with widely differing results.  Many 
states have enshrined prohibitions against same-sex marriages in their 
constitutions, while others have proceeded to legitimize marriage-style 
arrangements for same-sex couples, typically with the helpful assistance of 
state courts.  As noted earlier, state-to-state variation poses far more regular 
and vexing jurisdictional and choice-of-law problems in this context than are 
likely to arise in the abortion context.  So far, however, the state-by-state 
sorting process appears to work tolerably well. Whatever costs and 
inconveniences may flow from decentralized decision-making in this context, 
they pale against the costs of a constitutional amendment for or against same-
sex marriage, under Article V33 or the Supreme Court’s steam.34 
A second analogy is the end of Prohibition.  Here again, there are 
differences.  Most obviously, Prohibition was both enshrined35 and then 
repealed through an actual constitutional amendment,36 rather than judicial 
edict.  Still, the parallels between Richard Fallon’s hypothetical Roe reversal 
and the repeal of the Twenty-First Amendment are striking.  Here as there, the 
issue is the repeal of an earlier constitutional amendment.  Here as there, the 
repeal would allow the states to go their separate ways.  Here as there, the 
decision would involve a central issue of social conflict or, if you will, of the 
culture war.  In both cases, the central question is whether the underlying 
product is sinful or ordinary.  “Demon rum” or just another consumer good?  
The destruction of innocent life, or just another medical procedure? 
The end of Prohibition posed all of the problems Professor Fallon 
envisions, except more so.  It meant that alcohol would be sold, shipped, and 
advertised as a consumer product, and thousands of legal cases arose over the 
implications.  Questions of retroactive enforcement took on particular urgency, 
as thousands of prosecutions over past violations were still pending at the 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 34. See Michael S. Greve, Same Sex Marriage: Commit It to the States, FEDERALIST 
OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2004, available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040310_No.20_16486graphics.pdf. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States is hereby repealed.”). 
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time.37  The cases hit the courts at a time when the Supreme Court exercised 
much less discretion than it does now over its docket.  Questions arose over the 
scope of both federal and state authority, and they arose at a time when the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was undergoing a dramatic 
change for reasons unrelated to alcohol regulation. 
Despite all of this, the questions proved easily manageable.  The Supreme 
Court did entertain a number of relevant cases in the 1930s, many of them over 
the question of whether the Twenty-First Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon 
Act immunized state statutes that would otherwise violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.38  The Court’s answer was to let the states have their way.  
And with respect to violations of Prohibition-era federal statutes, the Court 
declared that the Twenty-First Amendment rendered the National Prohibition 
Act inoperative, cutting off all pending prosecutions under it.39  As near as one 
can tell, no serious political constituency mistook the Court’s jurisdictional 
determinations for verdicts on prohibition per se.  The constitutional rule 
having been repealed, the Court got out of the alcohol “umpiring” business, 
and by the 1940s, cases related to alcohol regulation practically disappeared 
from the Court’s docket.  It was another six decades before the Court seriously 
re-examined the question—when it was safe to do so, and under very different 
economic, technological, and social conditions.40 
V.  THE ECOLOGY OF ABORTION 
I fear that neither of my sanguine analogies will persuade Richard Fallon.  
Abortion, he might say (and did say, in the course of this colloquium) is more 
akin to slavery than to Prohibition or gay marriage.  It is a dispute as to who 
counts as a person, and in that contest, no quarter may be given.  If abortion is 
like slavery (or worse), how can one trust in jurisdictional sorting?  Why 
would people who believe that abortion is murder stop at state borders?  The 
opponents of Dred Scott did not stop at the borders; why should the opponents 
of Roe? 
At the bottom of Richard Fallon’s worry lies a deep distrust of anti-
abortion constituencies (or at least, the organized constituencies).  Let the 
Supreme Court repeal Roe, Professor Fallon imagines, and those constituencies 
 
 37. Don H. McLucas, Note, Some Legal Aspects of the Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, 
28 U. ILL. L. REV. 950, 956 n.34 (1934). 
 38. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 
U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Mich., 305 U.S. 391 
(1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938); State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. 
v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 (1932). 
 39. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222–23 (1934). 
 40. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (finding that the Twenty-First Amendment and 
the Webb-Kenyon Act did not immunize discriminatory state alcohol regulation against Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge). 
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will push to enact their extremist, punitive, vengeful agenda.  And in many 
states, they will succeed.  Remove that factual premise, and none of Professor 
Fallon’s scenarios makes sense. 
There are in fact people who believe, and institutions that teach, that 
abortion is the killing of innocent human life.  Contrary to Professor Fallon’s 
supposition, however, very few of those people and institutions believe that 
abortion is principally a law enforcement issue—a social problem that could be 
addressed by jailing tens of thousands of aborting women or by having public 
prosecutors troll after out-of-state abortion providers.  The vast majority of 
right-to-life advocates have a rather more nuanced view of the matter.  For 
example, they are inclined to think of women who have made that tragic 
choice as victims rather than perps.  The Catholic Church, by all accounts an 
organizational mainstay of the right-to-life movement, runs clinics and crisis 
centers for expectant mothers—and for women who have had abortions.41  
Perhaps, this is a clever public relations ploy and a concession to the spirit of 
the times.  But perhaps, the Church thinks that it is in the business of 
redeeming lives, as opposed to destroying them.  And perhaps, that quaint 
belief would survive a repeal of Roe. 
Richard Fallon’s inordinate fear of committing abortion to democratic 
politics is anything but idiosyncratic.  Precisely the same fear drives the 
modern Supreme Court: remove the judiciary’s careful superintendence of the 
nation’s moral and social life, the Justices apprehend, and Hark! What mayhem 
follows.42  Roe and its progeny are the most pristine exemplar.  In 1973, when 
it effectively legislated a model abortion statute for all fifty states, the Supreme 
Court sought to envision—and hasten—a progressive future, just as it had done 
so nobly and successfully in Brown v. Board of Education.43  Surely, the 
country would come to see the Court’s wisdom.  Surely, Roe would do to 
right-to-life constituencies what Brown and its progeny had done to racists—
decimate their ranks, and de-legitimize them as a force in American politics.  
When that did not come to pass, members of the Court sternly warned 
dissident citizens that they would be “tested by following.”44  That exhortation 
seems to have gone unheeded.  The ornery American people, including 
especially its right-to-life constituencies, insist on making their own moral 
judgments.  Those groups understand perfectly well that abortion leaves most 
of their fellow citizens deeply conflicted and ambivalent.  They likewise 
understand that abortion is not (to repeat) foremost a law enforcement issue but 
 
 41. See Alpha Health Services, Alpha Center: Services, http://www.alphacenter.org/services/ 
abortionrecovery.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Hope After Abortion, http://www.hopeafter 
abortion.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Project Rachel Outreach, http://www.usccb.org/ 
prolife/issues/postabortion/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 42. ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3–9 (2001). 
 43. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27–29 (1975). 
 44. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). 
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a fight for the hearts and minds of the American people.  Citizens who oppose 
abortion are perfectly prepared to wage that fight through persuasion, patiently 
and peacefully.  They do ask, however, that they be permitted to do so without 
being told by the United States Supreme Court that their position is illegitimate 
and beyond the bounds of democratic debate.45 
A repeal of Roe, Richard Fallon writes in what almost looks like a coda to 
his long and in many ways instructive discussion of post-Roe problems, could 
not be easily cabined.  It would likely have a large “butterfly effect.”46  The 
observation is correct, but the animal metaphor is off.  Roe is not a butterfly 
but a turtle—the turtle on which the Supreme Court’s universe has come to 
rest.  In some sense, it is true after all that the Supreme Court cannot easily 
leave the abortion-umpiring business.  The reason, however, is not that the 
abortion problem would promptly return in a jurisdictional garb.  The reason is 
that the umpiring of the nation’s mores has come to be the Court’s principal 
business.  It has come to define the Court’s institutional role and, more 
fatefully, public and political perceptions of that role.  A repeal of Roe would 
amount to an admission that the modern Court’s project has been profoundly 
ill-advised from the start.  That, to my mind, is the correct view.  But it is not 
an insight that will come easily to the Court. 
 
 45. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the majority’s reading of Casey implies that citizens may not express their sentiments on abortion 
through state legislation). 
 46. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 652. 
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